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Are Firms Successful at Selective
Hedging?*
We pursue a strategy of active risk manage-
ment—that is, we will only hedge a fraction of
our exposures and the percentage we choose to
hedge will be subject to continuous review. . . .
A reason for this approach is our belief that we
can add some value by changing our hedging
position when we have a view about future de-
velopments in our markets. (John van Roden,
Treasurer of Lukens, Inc.1)
We do not take speculative positions, but the
extent we are hedged depends on our views.
(Risk Manager, HDG [a Fortune 100 durable
goods producer]2)
* We have benefited from the comments of Tim Adam, Ken
Eades, Randy Heron, Tim Kruse, Jill Leyland from the World Gold
Council, Erik Lie, Adam Reed, Steve Slezak, Peter Tufano, an
anonymous referee and session participants at the 2002 Annual
Meetings of the American Finance Association, Depaul University,
Indiana University — Indianapolis, the University of North Car-
olina, the University of Oregon, Pennsylvania State University, Rice
University, and the University of Virginia (Darden School of Busi-
ness). We thank Art Dyck and Ted Reeve for their help in obtaining
some of the data used in the study. Christine Lee, Stephen McKeon,
and Joao Pereira provided excellent research assistance. Part of this
research was completed while Haushalter was with the Lundquist
College of Business, University of Oregon. Contact the correspond-
ing author, David Haushalter, at dhaushalter@psu.edu.
1. See “Bank of America Roundtable on Derivatives and Cor-
porate Risk Management,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,
8(3), Fall 1995.
2. See Brown (2001, 412).
We analyze the corporate
risk management policies
of 44 companies in the
gold mining industry.
Firms tend to decrease
hedging as prices move
against them—behavior
contrary to that predicted
by risk management the-
ory. These results, along
with new survey evi-
dence, suggest that firms
attempt to time market
prices, so-called selective
hedging. Although esti-
mates show a statistically
significant ability of pro-
ducers to favorably adjust
hedge ratios, this can be
attributed to sample-spe-
cific negative autocorrela-
tion in gold prices. Eco-
nomic gains to selective
hedging are small, and
no evidence suggests that
selective hedging leads to
superior operating or fi-
nancial performance.
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Recent research documents that managers’ market views influence corporate
financing decisions. For example, Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Baker, Green-
wood, and Wurgler (2003) document that corporate financing policy decisions
and the resulting capital structure largely reflect attempts by managers to time
the debt and equity markets. Faulkender (2005) finds that managers attempt
to time interest rates by adjusting the exposure of new debt issues to the shape
of the yield curve. Consistent with these findings, Graham and Harvey (2001)
provide survey evidence that managers often adjust the size and maturity of
debt issues in an attempt to time interest rates. Similarly, managers time the
issuance of equity according to whether they view their stock as undervalued
or overvalued.
The benefits that shareholders realize from managers incorporating their
market views into financing policy decisions are not clear. Conceivably, the
timing of the equity or debt markets can increase shareholder value if it enables
managers to exploit market inefficiencies, thus reducing a firm’s cost of capital.
However, as discussed by Roll (1986), Shefrin (2001), and Heaton (2002), if
overconfidence leads managers to believe that they have superior information
or ability when they do not, managers acting on their market views may in
fact destroy value. As Baker et al. (2003) conclude, “managers are almost
surely trying to time the debt markets, but despite suggestive evidence it is
hard to prove that their efforts reduce the overall cost of capital” (285).
In this study, we investigate the influence of managers’ views on a different
aspect of corporate financial policy: risk management. More specifically, we
focus on managers’ attempts to time commodity markets with their risk man-
agement policy decisions. Stulz (1996) calls this practice “selective” hedging.
He points out that selective hedging will increase shareholder value if man-
agers have an informational advantage relative to other market participants.
However, if managers believe they have informational advantages when they
do not, selective hedging will merely result in an increase in the variability
of cash flows that could potentially reduce shareholder value.
We conduct our analysis using quarterly data on the risk management prac-
tices of 44 firms in the gold mining industry between 1993 and 1998. The
impact of managers’ views on risk management decisions is shown in a number
of different ways. First, we document substantial time-series variability in the
fraction of an exposure hedged by a typical corporation. For example, the
average hedge ratio for gold producers is 0.215 with a standard deviation of
0.125. Second, risk management theory suggests that changes in the hedge
ratio are associated with changes in firm-specific characteristics such as the
probability of financial distress. We find no evidence that changes in the hedge
ratio are associated with these firm-specific characteristics. However, opposite
most predictions of risk management theory, changes to the hedge ratio are
positively associated with contemporaneous (and lagged) changes in gold
prices. In other words, when gold prices fall and producers are presumably
more likely to experience financial distress, gold producers actually hedge
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less.3 Finally, we contact many of these companies directly. Similar to the
survey results described in Stulz (1996), companies in our sample frequently
report adjusting derivative positions based on market views.4
We find that managers can generate statistically significant gross profits
from varying their hedge ratios during our sample period. However, the eco-
nomic magnitude of gains is quite small even before accounting for the mar-
ginal costs associated with selective hedging such as transaction costs, man-
agerial effort, or costs of deviating from an optimal hedging policy. We
estimate that these gains are similar in magnitude to those from a simple
contrarian trading strategy of increasing hedge ratios (or selling gold) when
prices rise and vice-versa. We also find no compelling evidence that selective
hedging leads to better performance based on a wide range of operating or
financial dimensions (e.g., faster growth, greater improvements in operating
income, or greater market valuations).
By focusing on single-commodity (gold) producers, we are examining firms
most likely to have a comparative advantage in their product market and
therefore most likely to be successful at selective hedging.5 However, survey
and anecdotal evidence suggests that selective hedging is also common when
firms manage FX and interest rate risk (see Bodnar et al., 1998). Because
nonfinancial firms are unlikely to have superior information in these financial
markets, it is even less likely that selective hedging would be successful
enough to substantially increase firm value. For example, using similar tech-
niques, we also examine the hedging policies of HDG (a durable goods man-
ufacturer described in Brown [2001]) and its hedging of foreign exchange
risk. Evidence suggests that HDG managers also incorporate their views into
FX risk management decisions. In fact, we find greater variability of hedge
3. However, some theory, such as Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), suggests that any relation
between prices and optimal hedge ratio is feasible depending on the optimal investment policy
of the firm.
4. Stulz focuses on the results of two surveys. The first is a 1995 survey of derivative usage
conducted by the Wharton School of Business and the Chase Manhattan Bank in which over a
third of the derivative users said that they sometimes “actively take positions” that reflect their
market views. The second is a survey in Dolde (1993) in which almost 90% of derivative users
indicated that they sometimes took a view. Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston (1998) survey a large
sample of nonfinancial corporations about their use of derivatives. Among users of foreign
exchange derivatives, about 60% state that their market views frequently or sometimes affect
the timing and size of their hedges; 32% actively take positions based on their views. Users of
interest rate derivatives report a similar likelihood for altering the size or timing of hedges based
on views and 41% actively take positions. In addition to these surveys, Naik and Yadav (2003)
provide empirical evidence on the selective hedging by bond dealers.
5. Naik and Yadav (2003) use daily observations of dealers’ positions in UK government bonds
and related derivative contracts to calculate the dealers’ net spot risk exposures. They find that
dealers’ net spot risks vary over time and interpret this as evidence that dealers selectively hedge
their exposure. Returns earned by dealers from selective hedging are not distinguishably different
from returns earned by fully hedging exposures. Although it is commonly accepted that dealers
in financial markets might possess superior information by virtue of observing order flow, it is
less obvious how nonfinancial corporations could obtain an informational advantage. It is pri-
marily for this reason that we wish to examine the risk management practices of industrial firms.
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ratios at HDG than we find for gold producers. However, there is no evidence
that these managers are able to time changes in foreign exchange rates.6
Taken together, our results imply that many managers believe they possess
informational advantages in the markets where they hedge and that these
beliefs affect corporate risk management decisions. Nonetheless, managers
rarely have advantages that can be translated into substantial increases in
shareholder value.
I. Data
The construction of our sample is determined by the availability of frequently
reported and detailed data on firms’ use of derivatives. Gold producers are
unusual in that detailed data concerning the hedging of gold price risk are
publicly available. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no additional
transaction-level data on derivative use by nonfinancial corporations that are
publicly available.
We use quarterly data for 44 gold producers that describe the fraction of
production each producer hedges against price risk from 1993 to 1998. The
raw data are provided by Ted Reeve, formerly a financial analyst for Scotia
Capital Markets. The companies included in Mr. Reeve’s database are publicly
traded gold producers based in the United States and Canada. The database
provides information on the derivative instruments held by these firms, in-
cluding the amount of the firm’s expected future production and specific
information regarding each of the firm’s derivative contracts, for example,
the strike price and maturity of each option. Further descriptions of this data-
base are provided in Tufano (1996) and Adam (2002).
These data are used to calculate the fraction of future production a producer
has hedged at the end of each quarter—our proxy for the companies’ hedge
ratio. This measure is consistent with how companies generally view the extent
of their hedging. To estimate the fraction of future production hedged in each
quarter, we measure hedging as the “delta-equivalent” number of ounces
hedged against price fluctuations using financial derivatives that mature within
3 years.7 We scale this value by the projected production, measured as the
number of ounces of gold that the company expects to produce in the next
6. The results of this analysis are not reported but are available upon request.
7. More specifically, we measure the amount of production hedged using the aggregate dollar
delta of outstanding derivative contracts. The aggregate delta value can be thought of as the
equivalent ounces hedged. Delta is an estimate of the rate at which the value of a financial
instrument will change as the value of the asset underlying the instrument changes. Typically,
the delta ranges between 0 and 1 if the derivative creates a position that is effectively long the
underlying asset and between 0 and 1 if the derivative creates a position that is effectively
short the underlying asset. Because our companies are almost always shorting their exposures
as hedges, we reverse the sign for exposition. Hence, our hedge ratio or “fraction of production
hedged” reflects the dollar increase in hedge portfolio value for each dollar decrease in underlying
exposure value. For example, assume a gold producer has hedged 20% of production, then if
the value of the next 3 years of gold production declines by $1, the hedge portfolio will increase
in value $0.20.
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Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Gold producers (all) .215 .126 .125 .096 23.1 18.8
Active hedgers .339 .279 .191 .165 36.2 30.6
Inactive hedgers .091 .051 .059 .067 10.0 8.7
Note.—This table reports summary statistics for the extent of hedging (“Hedge Ratio”) by sample firms
as measured by absolute hedge portfolio deltas. The first two columns show mean and median hedge ratios.
The second two columns show mean and median standard deviation (SD) of hedge ratios. The last two columns
show the mean and median fraction of observations for which the change in hedge ratio is greater than 0.1.
Means and medians are calculated using individual firm values. The sample consists of quarterly observations
for the extent to which 44 gold producers hedged gold production from 1993 to 1998. Firms are divided into
two subgroups: active (inactive) hedgers are firms with a hedge ratio standard deviation above (below) the
industry median.
3 years. We use a 3-year window in our calculations because projected pro-
duction beyond this point is often not available. However, this window ac-
counts for nearly all of the gold derivatives held by the sample firms. For
example, approximately 94% of the derivative positions in the database mature
within 3 years.
The hedge ratio can change quarterly as firms adjust their production es-
timates, although most of the quarter-to-quarter variation in production hedged
is a result of changes to derivative positions. The coefficient of variation
during the sample period is 2.95 for the deltas hedged and only 1.48 for the
expected level of production. In addition, in a survey that we describe below,
companies generally report altering the amount of gold they hedge (rather
than altering production) in response to changes in their outlook for gold
prices.
Finally, for a producer to be included in our study, we also require that
information on its hedging practices be available for at least half of the quarters
during the sample period and that financial data for the producer are available
in COMPUSTAT. Our final sample consists of 658 quarterly observations for
44 gold producers.
II. Time-Series Variation in Hedging Policies
A. Summary Characteristics
Hedging is a common practice among the firms in our sample. Only two gold
producers did not hedge at all in the sample period. Table 1 reports the average
and median hedge ratio and the standard deviation of hedge ratios. The mean
(median) hedge ratio is 0.215 (0.126) for gold producers. Hedge ratios through
time are plotted in figure 1.
Our primary interest is the time-series variation in the extent of hedging.
In particular, table 1 and figure 1 reveal substantial time-series variability in
the hedge ratios of these firms. The standard deviation of quarterly hedge
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Fig. 1.—This figure plots absolute portfolio deltas for gold producers. Panel B
separates firms into two groups of 22 firms labeled as active and inactive hedgers
(based on the standard deviation of each firm’s hedge ratio).
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ratios for the average (median) gold producer is 0.125 (0.096). To further
reveal the extent of this variability, we calculate the fraction of observations
in which the change in the hedge ratio from the previous period is at least
0.10. The mean value is 23.1%. In other words, based on the average hedge
ratio of 0.215, the average gold producer changes its hedge ratio by roughly
one-half about once every four quarters.
The time-series variability in gold firms’ hedging policies becomes more
apparent when we separate gold producers into groups according to the stan-
dard deviation of their hedge ratios during the sample period. Firms with a
standard deviation above the median producer in the sample are considered
“active” hedgers. Other gold producers are “inactive” hedgers. By defining
active hedgers in this manner we create a bias toward selecting firms that
hedge more. However, results from our analysis are similar when we segment
the sample using alternative measures of the variability in the hedger ratio,
such as the variance of the hedge ratio divided by the mean hedge ratio.
As shown in table 1 and figure 1 (panel B), the gold producers that are
classified as “active” hedge more extensively than the other producers. The
mean hedge ratio equals 0.339 for the active hedgers and 0.091 for the inactive
hedgers. By construction there exists greater variability in the policies of active
hedgers than for other producers. The standard deviation of hedge ratios is
0.191 for the active hedgers and 0.059 for the inactive hedgers. Also, the
average active hedger changes its hedge ratio by at least 0.10 in 36.2% of
the observations. Inactive hedgers only make a change of this magnitude
10.0% of the time.
B. Determinants of Selective Hedging
An interesting aspect of these data is the degree of variation in hedge ratios
across firms. If these differences reflect varying degrees of selective hedging,
we may be able to identify firm characteristics that explain which firms se-
lectively hedge. Stulz (1996) suggests that firms that can afford to be wrong
are more likely to selectively hedge. For example, firms that are less financially
constrained or have fewer growth opportunities should be in a better position
to absorb losses from incorrect market calls. Stulz also argues that only firms
with an informational advantage should selectively hedge. If larger firms are
more likely to have an informational advantage, we should observe a positive
relation between selective hedging and firm size or market share. Tufano
(1996) concludes that managerial risk aversion explains cross-sectional dif-
ferences in the level of hedge ratios for gold producers. Consequently, we
conjecture that factors related to managerial ownership and compensation
could explain cross-sectional differences in the variation of hedge ratios.
We estimate regressions with the standard deviation of quarterly hedge ratios
of gold producers as the dependent variable. As independent variables, we
include firm size (log of total assets), share of projected gold production in
our sample as a proxy for market share, Altman’s Z-score to measure financial
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flexibility, operating margin as another possible measure of financial flexibility,
and the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for growth or investment opportunities.
The estimation results, which we do not report here, indicate few significant
relations between these variables and the variability of hedge ratios. The only
coefficient significantly different from zero at conventional levels is the mar-
ket-to-book ratio with a coefficient of -0.039 and p-value of .038. This is
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that firms with greater growth op-
portunities do less selective hedging.
We also collect data regarding companies’ ownership structure and com-
pensation policy similar to the variables used by Tufano (1996). Because these
data are available for only a subset (38) of our firms, we estimate a separate
regression including these factors. (These results are also not presented.) We
examine whether the cross-sectional differences in the variation in firms’
hedging policies are associated with difference in firms’ ownership structure
or compensation policy. We regress the standard deviation in the fraction of
production a company hedges on the percentage ownership of officers and
directors, the percentage of the board made up of outsiders, and option com-
pensation as a percent of total compensation. We find no consistent relations
between these variables and variation in firms’ hedge ratios. Furthermore, in
this specification the coefficient on market-to-book is no longer significant at
the 10% level. In summary, it is not possible to determine from our analysis
what characteristics, if any, account for differences in the variation of hedge
ratios across gold producers.
C. How Important Are Managerial Views?
Although there is a great deal of time-series variation in hedge ratios, this
evidence alone is not sufficient to conclude that firms are selectively hedging.
Financial theory offers a wide range of factors that can influence a company’s
optimal hedge ratio.8 As these factors change, a firm is expected to change
its hedging policy. However, from an empirical standpoint, measuring the
importance of these factors on the choice of a hedge ratio is a daunting task.
For example, although strategic concerns related to changes in estimated long-
term supply or industry consolidation might lead to a large change in a given
firm’s preferred hedge ratio, accurately measuring changes (or perceived
changes) in these factors can be difficult. Also, although data on other factors
that likely influence the hedge ratio are more readily available, financial theory
does not provide precise predictions on how changes in these factors are related
to changes in hedge ratios. For example, changes in the likelihood of financial
distress might have an effect on a manager’s decision before becoming ap-
parent from accounting measures. Other factors might have a lagged effect.
8. Financial theorists have focused on how corporate risk management can increase shareholder
value by reducing costs associated with market imperfections, such as bankruptcy costs, taxes,
informational asymmetries, and managerial risk aversion; for example, see Stulz (1984), Smith
and Stulz (1985), Campbell and Kracaw (1990), Bessembinder (1991), Froot et al. (1993),
DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), and Mello and Parsons (2000).
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Given the difficulties in correctly specifying a regression that would dis-
entangle these effects, we examine the importance of managerial views by
directly contacting managers with a survey inquiring about risk management
practices. The survey is modeled after Bodnar et al. (1998) and Graham and
Harvey (2001). We mailed this survey to 30 gold producers identified as
currently operating. Companies’ responses support the conclusion that for
many firms managers’ market views have a significant effect on hedge ratios.
The results for the 13 responding gold producers are presented in the ap-
pendix. Seven (nine) of 13 gold producers report sometimes altering the timing
(size) of their hedges due to an outlook for future gold prices. Seven (54%)
of these firms sometimes or frequently “actively take positions in gold de-
rivatives” based on market views. When asked “how important are each of
the following factors in determining the extent to which your company
hedges?” the two most important factors cited are “a long-term market view
on gold prices” and “a near-term market view on gold prices.” Third and
fourth most important are “a recent increase or decrease in gold prices” and
“pricing of derivative contracts (e.g., implied volatility).” Least important are
“competitors’ hedging strategies” and “the outcome of prior hedges.” Only
two respondents believed gold prices were never predictable and that gold is
never “either significantly undervalued or overvalued in the market.” We also
used the survey response to check our classification of gold producers as
active versus inactive hedgers by creating a 10-point scale designed to capture
how actively a firm selectively hedges.9 The correlation between this measure
and the standard deviation of the hedge ratio is 0.79, indicating that the
standard deviation of the hedge ratio is a good measure of the degree of
selective hedging.
Despite the aforementioned limitations of statistically explaining changes
in hedge ratios, we also run regressions (not reported) to determine which
firm characteristics are associated with quarterly changes in hedge ratios. This
allows for including a more complete sample of gold producers, rather than
just those that responded to the survey. As explanatory variables we include
changes in financial, operating, and market conditions.10 Consistent with risk
9. The scale is calculated using survey questions 1a–c and 2a–d. For questions 1a–c, 1.0 (2.0)
points are given for responding sometimes (frequently). For questions 2a–d, points of 2.0, 1.5,
1.0, 0.5, 0.0 are given for responses of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Thus a firm that responded
“frequently” to questions 1a–c and “very important” to questions 2a–d would receive a score of
10.0 and a firm that responded “never” and “not at all important” to the same questions would
receive a score of 0.0.
10. We include variables commonly used in other empirical studies examining risk management
by nonfinancial firms. Specifically, we include the ratio of working capital to assets, retained
earnings to assets, earnings before interest and taxes to assets, market value of equity to debt,
sales to assets (all components of Altman’s Z-score), the book value of assets, the market-to-
book value of equity, and the change in the implied volatility of options on the near-term gold
futures contract. The data used to calculate these proxies for firm-specific financial characteristics
come from COMPUSTAT. The data on implied volatility and prices for gold are from Bridge
Data. To account for probable nonlinear associations between changes in these variables and
changes in hedging policies, we also include the square of these variables in our regressions.
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management theory, several of the other proxies for variables related to
changes in financial conditions are shown to be associated with changes in
the hedge ratio. For example, both changes in EBITDA (earnings before
interest, taxes, and depreciation) and changes in sales are negatively correlated
with changes in the hedge ratio. In contrast to predictions that companies
hedge to reduce the expected costs of financial distress, there is positive
correlation between changes in hedge ratio and concurrent changes in gold
prices. The results are consistent with managers attempting to lock in high
prices and waiting out low prices in hope of a rebound, an approach similar
to “equity market timing” discussed by Baker and Wurgler (2002). This in-
terpretation implies that managers are selectively hedging and view gold prices
as mean-reverting. As discussed below, there is little empirical evidence of
reliable mean-reversion in gold prices across quarters. In summary, market
views seem to have an important effect on companies’ risk management
policies, although we can not determine precisely how much of the variability
in gold producers’ hedge ratios is a reflection of selective hedging.
III. Hedging and Subsequent Market Returns
We find that changes in hedge ratios are positively associated with changes
in gold prices. In other words, companies hedge more when gold prices
increase and hedge less when gold prices decrease. To earn excess returns
from using such a strategy, gold prices must be mean-reverting. We conduct
our own time-series analysis of gold prices over a long time period (from
1978 to 1998) and find some evidence that gold prices mean-revert very
slowly.11 However, the characteristics of gold price changes are very sample-
specific. For example, during the latter part of the period coinciding with our
sample (1992–98), the percent changes in quarterly gold prices are signifi-
cantly negatively autocorrelated (correlation coefficient p 0.296), but quar-
terly price changes over the 15 years predating our sample (1978–92) are
significantly positively autocorrelated (correlation coefficient p 0.294).
Cheung and Lai (1993) and Schwartz (1997) have explored this issue and
find little evidence to indicate that gold prices mean-revert or that the gold
market is not weak-form efficient. Recent studies from broad cross-sections
of commodity futures markets generally support (at least) weak-form efficient
commodity markets. For example, Kellard et al. (1999) provide evidence that
commodities futures markets are long-run efficient, and short-run inefficiencies
are relatively small. Irwin, Zuluaf, and Jackson (1996) find no support for
the existence of mean-reversion in commodity futures prices. These studies
suggest that over the long run a firm can only expect to earn excess returns
from trading if it possesses an informational advantage.
11. We estimate a GARCH model of monthly gold prices using data from January 1978 to
December 1998 and find an AR(1) coefficient of 0.944, which is significantly less than 1.0 at
the 1% level in a two-tailed test.
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Although our sample is determined by data availability, a case can be made
for why the companies in the sample might possess valuable private infor-
mation. The gold producers in our sample include many of the largest pro-
ducers in the world. Consequently, they may have superior insights into the
supply of gold as well as demand from large customers.
Anecdotal evidence suggests an informational asymmetry exists between
producers and the market. Specifically, gold prices react when producers an-
nounce changes in their hedging strategies. For example, the price of gold
shot up almost 8% on February 6, 2000, the day Placer Dome, a relatively
large gold producer, announced it was reducing the extent of its hedging. The
following day, prices dropped by almost 3% when Barrick Gold, another large
producer, announced that it would maintain its strategy of hedging exten-
sively.12 The standard deviation of daily returns for the preceding 200 trading
days prior to these events is 1.2%. Although these returns are consistent with
the notion that gold producers have superior information about gold prices,
an alternative interpretation is that investors believe hedging has an effect on
prices. For example, a reduction in hedging by producers reduces the supply
of gold for which buyers can lock in future prices. This reduction in the known
future supply of gold potentially increases the probability that higher prices
for gold can be realized. We cannot differentiate between these stories. To
directly examine whether producers indeed have informational advantages,
we now turn to analyzing the statistical and economic importance of the gains
from selective hedging.
A. Univariate Analysis
We first examine whether companies have a comparative advantage by testing
their ability to time hedging decisions. We use a method similar to that sug-
gested by Henriksson and Merton (1981). Our tests examine whether changes
in firms’ hedging policies are in the “correct” direction relative to the changes
in gold prices in the subsequent period. If firms have a comparative advantage
in predicting future prices relative to other market participants, we expect to
find that firms increase the extent of hedging before price decreases (and
decrease their extent of hedging before price increases).
We examine the relation between a change in the hedge ratio and subsequent
changes in gold prices. In table 2 we report success rates for the pooled sample
and the median firm for the entire sample period. For all gold producers, we
find that on average the changes companies make to their hedging policies
are in the correct direction 55.2% of the time. The median gold producer
makes changes in the correct direction 53.7% of the time. This value is
significantly greater than 50% (p-value p .019). We also examine the success
of the subset of gold producers that we classify as active hedgers. The per-
12. See “Placer Dome alters hedging strategy, giving gold a lift,” Wall Street Journal, February
7, 2000 and “Gold sinks after Barrick’s strategy disappoints,” Wall Street Journal, February 8,
2000.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































formance of the active hedgers is not better than that of the total sample.
Active hedgers make a change that is in the correct direction 54.6% of the
time. The median active hedger is also correct 53.7% of the time.
Table 2 also reports values for tests based on two alternative measures. We
do this because success rates may be muddied by inconsequential changes in
hedge ratios and prices, or the one-period horizon may be too short. For
example, in six of the 24 quarters from 1993 to 1998 the absolute change in
gold prices was less than 1%. First, we reestimate how often firms are correct
by only considering larger “material” changes in hedging and prices. A ma-
terial change in the hedge ratio is defined as an absolute change in excess of
5 percentage points. In addition, the absolute change in prices must exceed
3 percentage points to be considered material. These values are roughly the
average quarterly absolute change in hedge ratios and prices during the sample
period. Second, we recalculate the fraction of firms making changes in the
correct direction through a two-period—6 month—window.
The results using material changes show that firms are better at predicting
material changes. The mean pooled success rates for all producers and active
hedgers increase to 66.1% and 69.2%, respectively. Both of these values are
significantly greater than 50% at about the 5% level. Median success rates
are 66.7% for each group (both significant at the 1% level). As before, there
is little evidence to indicate that active hedgers are better at anticipating
changes in gold prices than other producers. However, success rates using
price changes over the two-periods reveals a substantial drop in predictive
ability by gold producers to near 50%. Overall, these results indicate that gold
producers may have an ability to predict short-run changes in gold prices and
are better at predicting and acting on changes of larger magnitudes. However,
active hedgers are not significantly better than inactive hedgers.
B. Multivariate Analysis
The univariate Henriksson-Merton test statistic relies critically on the as-
sumption that the probability of a correct forecast is independent of the mag-
nitude of subsequent asset returns. Given the overall stronger results for ma-
terial changes presented in the previous section, we turn to more general tests
of market-timing ability. Specifically, we utilize tests similar to the regression
methods proposed by Cumby and Modest (1987) and Graham and Harvey
(1996). In addition to considering the magnitude of changes in hedge ratios
and prices, these methods can account for the effects of the other potential
determinants of time-series variation discussed in Section II. Specifically, we
estimate the multivariate model
Dh p b ∗ Dgold  b ∗ Dz   .i,t 1 t1 2 i,t i,t
For these regressions, Dhi,t is the change in hedge ratio by firm i from period
to period t; Dgoldt1 is the return on gold between period t and a futuret  1
period; Dzi,t measures changes in the other financial, operating, and market
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TABLE 3 Success of Selective Hedging
Gold Producers
b1
One Period Ahead Two Periods Ahead
All producers
( )N p 537 .333 (.030) .207 (.080)
Active hedgers
( )N p 305 .488 (.055) .247 (.168)
Note.—This table reports coefficients and p-values from Cumby and Modest (1987) tests of market timing
ability. The analysis estimates hedgers’ success at changing hedge ratios in anticipation of subsequent changes
in prices. Regressions are estimated for the model
Dh p b (Dexp )  b (Dz )   .i,t 1 t1 2 i,t i,t
Dhi,t is the change in hedge ratio by firm i from period to period t. Dexpt1 is the percentage change int  1
gold price from period t to the next period(s). Dzi,t is the change in other characteristics of the firm between
period to period t. The regressions are estimated using random-effects models (based on Hausmant  1
specification tests). However, the results are insensitive to the fixed-effect or random-effects specification. The
sample is described in the text and tables 1 and 2. The second column reports coefficients from regressions
using the two-period change in prices or rates as described in table 4. P-values (reported in parentheses) are
from one-tailed t-tests using heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors against a null of zero. Coefficients
significantly different from zero at the 10% level are displayed in bold text. N reports the total number of
observations.
conditions between period and period t, described in section II.C. Thet  1
regressions are estimated using a random-effects model. The coefficient of
primary interest is b1. If a company has the ability to forecast future returns,
b1 will be negative. In other words, the change in hedging will be opposite
the change in prices, so firms will be hedged less when prices increase and
vice-versa.
Coefficients (b1) and p-values from estimating regressions are reported in
table 3. Estimating the model using all gold producers results in a b1 coefficient
that is negative and statistically significant. The results are consistent with
the univariate tests showing that changes in hedge ratios are in the correct
direction in a majority of cases. These results suggest that even after accounting
for other factors, on average, changes in gold producers’ hedge ratios can
predict future price changes. When the sample is restricted to only active
hedgers, the coefficient b1 is slightly larger in magnitude but less statistically
significant due to the reduced number of observations. As in the univariate
analysis, we also estimate these regressions using two-quarter-ahead changes
in gold prices. Table 3 also reports these results. In this case, only the co-
efficient for the regression with all gold producers is significantly negative.
In both cases, the coefficients are smaller than the one-period estimates sug-
gesting firms are better at near-term forecasts.
Although the results presented in tables 2 and 3 are consistent with the idea
that producers have valuable private information about prices, an alternative
explanation is that this association between hedging and subsequent changes
in gold prices is self-fulfilling. This view has been offered by critics of hedging
by gold producers who contend that changes in hedging programs can exert
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pressure on the market that leads to changes in gold prices.13 In part, this
pressure is exacerbated by the structure of the gold derivatives market. When
gold producers sell contracts forward, the common practice of bullion banks
(who are often on the other side of these trades) is to offset their long position
in the forward contract by borrowing gold from a central bank and selling it
on the spot market. Therefore, the more extensively that gold producers hedge,
the greater the amount of gold the bullion banks sell into the spot markets.
Similarly, when gold producers cut back on their hedging, bullion banks buy
gold in the spot markets.
The effect of bullion banks is compounded by the fact that a relatively
large fraction of the gold producers change their hedging in the same direction.
In calculations not shown here, we find that gold producers tend to change
their hedging in the same direction. For example, among active hedgers, an
average of 59% of the producers change the extent of their hedging in the
same direction. In two of the quarters during the sample period, 77% of the
active hedgers changed the extent of their hedging in the same direction. So
the increase of hedging by one producer, which leads to the selling of gold
into the spot market by a bullion bank, is generally not entirely offset by the
decrease in hedging by another producer. If this argument is true, we would
need to examine hedging and price changes in a more general economic
setting. This is because we cannot determine if the apparent success that gold
producers have realized in predicting gold prices is a function of comparative
advantages or simply due to the market impact of their changes in hedging
policy.14
IV. Do Shareholders Benefit from Selective Hedging?
Although the mechanism linking hedging and gold prices is not entirely clear,
the issue of primary concern to shareholders is the economic implications of
selective hedging. For example, it could be that firms only rarely have superior
information about future prices, but when this occurs, they can profit greatly.
We estimate the benefits shareholders realize from selective hedging in two
general ways. First, we focus on the direct gains or losses from selective
hedging. Second, we look at the association between selective hedging and
subsequent changes in operating characteristics and financial performance.
This second approach should incorporate any direct and indirect benefits from
selective hedging.
13. For a discussion of this argument and the structure of the gold market, see “New rules
needed for gold hedging,” RISK, July 2000, and Cross (2000).
14. We examine the possibility that the spot prices are particularly sensitive to the temporary
shocks to the gold supply caused by changes in hedging by gold producers by reestimating the
regressions shown in table 3 using the change in the value of the futures contract that expires
in the subsequent quarter, rather than the spot price, as the dependent variable. The results using
this alternative specification are qualitatively similar to those shown in table 5.
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A. Estimating the Gains from Selective Hedging
To estimate the gains and losses from selective hedging, we develop four
alternative proxies for the extent of a firm’s selective hedging each period.
We do this because we cannot determine exactly which part of the variation
in hedge ratios is due to selective hedging, and we want to limit the chance
of not finding significant gains from selective hedging if they, in fact, exist.
The different measures are designed to capture variation through time, across
firms, and net of other factors that may determine hedge ratios—in short,
nearly any type of variation that could be attributed to selective hedging.
The first measure is the change in the hedge ratio from the previous period.
This measure assumes that the entire change in the hedge ratio from the
previous period reflects changes in the managers’ outlook for prices. The
second proxy is the difference between a company’s hedge ratio for the period
and the industry average hedge ratio for the period. We include this measure
to account for the possibility that a corporation’s hedging strategy largely
depends on its competitor’s hedging strategy (despite the survey evidence
presented in Section II) as discussed in Froot et al. (1993). Technically, this
measure assumes that the company can observe contemporaneous changes in
its competitors’ hedge ratios. However, the results are very similar when we
use deviations from the prior quarter’s average hedge ratio (but this lagged
measure results in a smaller sample, so we focus on the contemporaneous
measure).
Our third proxy for the extent of selective hedging is the difference between
a firm’s hedge ratio and its average hedge ratio during the entire sample
period. This measure assumes that the average amount of hedging is a suitable
proxy for the extent to which a company would hedge if managers did not
incorporate their views into the company’s hedging policy. It uses the com-
panies’ hedge ratios in future periods (for all but the last period of the sample).
The fourth proxy is the residual for each observation from the random-effects
regressions discussed in Section II, in which the change in hedge ratio is
regressed on changes in firm-specific and market characteristics. This measure
assumes that changes in hedging that cannot be explained by these factors
are attributable to selective hedging. Estimation of this proxy also uses in-
formation from future periods.
To calculate the change in the number of ounces hedged that can be at-
tributed to selective hedging, we multiply our proxy for the extent of selective
hedging by the projected production in the next 3 years. We call this product
the “unexplained” change in the hedging policy. Gains from selectively hedg-
ing are calculated by multiplying the unexplained change in hedging by the
dollar change in gold prices in the following period. For example, consider
our third proxy of the extent of selective hedging. Assuming that a company’s
average hedge ratio for the full sample period is 30%, its hedge ratio at the
end of quarter t is 45%, and its projected production for the next 3 years is
1,000,000 ounces, we attribute 15% of the company’s hedge ratio to selective
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hedging (45% minus 30%). Therefore, the unexplained change in the hedge
ratio is an increase of 150,000 ounces (15% # 1,000,000). If the price of
gold decreases by $20 in quarter , the estimated gain from selectivet  1
hedging in quarter t is $3,000,000 (150,000 # $20).
Estimated average gains (per quarter) from selective hedging for the median
firm are reported in table 4. The gains are positive and statistically significant
in many cases. In fact, for the active hedgers, these values are positive and
statistically significant using all four of our proxies for the degree of selective
hedging. For example, gains based on the deviation from the industry average
(col. 2) increase the cash flow by $204,900 per quarter for the median active
hedger. Using the residual method (col. 4) yields an estimate of increases in
cash flow of $93,700 per quarter. We note that in every case the estimated
gains for all gold producers are less than the gains for active hedgers, but
differences between active and inactive hedgers are statistically significant at
the 10% level only for the industry-deviation and residual methods (cols. 2
and 4).
Although the precise magnitudes of estimated gains depend on the proxy
employed, the average economic significance is always small. The median
gains per quarter among all gold producers are always less than 0.05% of
total assets and 0.5% of sales.15 For active hedgers, gains always amount to
less than 0.1% of total assets and 1.0% of sales. The median values mask
substantial variation across firms, and for a few firms, the nominal gains (or
losses) are economically large. Using results from the residual method (col.
4), the worst company in the sample loses an average of $2.2 million per
quarter over the sample period by selectively hedging. Six of 42 gold producers
(14.3%) realized gains of more than $500,000 per quarter. Still, no gold
producer has average gains or losses of more than 1% of total assets or 10%
of sales. Results from other methods also reveal substantial variation in es-
timated gains.
To better interpret these values, we compare them to estimated gains from a
simple contrarian trading strategy. Specifically, during quarters in which gold
prices increase, we assume the company will increase its hedge ratio for the
following quarter (and vice versa). This trading strategy is consistent with a
firm that believes in mean-reverting gold prices and is attempting to trade the
market, or selectively hedge.16 We set the quarterly change in a company’s
hedge ratio equal to the standard deviation of its hedge ratio during our sample
period.17 As discussed in Section II.B, changes in the hedging policies of gold
producers are positively associated with the contemporaneous price changes.
15. We do not scale these profits by operating profits, because operating income is negative
for some gold producers during this sample period.
16. We note that the opposite approach (a momentum strategy that reduces the hedge ratio
following price increases) would be more consistent with hedging to reduce risks of financial
distress.
17. This is an intuitive benchmark because it results in hypothetical hedge ratio volatility very
similar to actual hedge ratio volatility and is the simplest possible contrarian strategy.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Therefore, the changes in the hedge ratio made using this naive contrarian
strategy will often be in the same direction as the changes made by some of
the companies in the sample.
We estimate the gains from this contrarian strategy for a company in quarter
t as the product of the change in prices in quarter t, the amount of forecasted
production in period t, and this change in the hedge ratio for period t (based
on change in prices in quarter ). Results from these calculations aret  1
reported in column 5 of table 4. The estimated gains from using this strategy
are $188,200 for the median gold producer and roughly $304,400 for the
median active hedger. Hence, the median gains from this benchmark strategy
are greater than those realized by the companies using any of the four proxies
we develop. For example, for 74% of the firms in the entire sample (and 73%
of the active hedgers), the gains from this strategy exceed the estimated gains
from the most profitable selective hedging strategy we examine (the deviations
from the firm’s sample average). The reason for the success of this contrarian
strategy is the negative autocorrelation in quarterly gold price changes during
our sample period. In summary, the changes firms made result in underper-
formance relative to this simple mechanical benchmark even though the median
company followed a strategy that would benefit from negative autocorrelation.
We note several important caveats to the results in this section. First, our
estimates do not incorporate any transaction costs the producers incurred in
making changes to hedge ratios, nor do we subtract the marginal costs of
running a selective hedging program (e.g., increased accounting, personnel,
oversight costs, and costs of deviating from an optimal hedging policy). These
costs might be substantial and could erode or exceed the magnitude of the
estimated gains from selective hedging. Second, the potential impact of hedg-
ing by gold producers on the gold market (as described above) makes it
difficult to estimate the extent that gold prices would have changed if producers
did not adjust their policies. The third and final caveat suggests a still more
cautious interpretation of our point estimates. Implicitly, we assume that se-
lective hedging accounts for only the unexplained variation in hedge ratios
and not the level of the average hedge ratio. It could also be that selective
hedging is responsible for differences in average hedge ratios that are appre-
ciably above or below the average hedge ratios managers would choose if
they did not selectively hedge. For example, because gold prices decreased
during the sample period, and these companies tend to reduce the extent of
their hedging when prices decrease, the average amount of hedging we observe
might be less than it would have been if companies were not selectively
hedging. Therefore, the cash flows from hedging could have been even greater
(or less). We are not aware of any method that would let us account for this
potential bias, so we only note the possible effect on our results.
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TABLE 5 Other Potential Benefits from Selective Hedging
Inactive Hedgers Active Hedgers
Mean Median Mean Median
Size:
Change in production .027 .026 .017 .011
Change in total reserves .029 .015 .025 .024
Change in sales .024 .015 .026 .026
Change in total assets .036 .023 .021 .026
Operating performance:
Operating margin .125 .174 .099 .037*
Change in operating margin .013 .004 .036 .007
Change in return on assets .251 .019 .444 .046
Market value of equity:
Change in market-to-book .014 .016 .039 .029*
Total market return on equity .027 .018 .059 .050
Note.—The table reports summary statistics for quarterly changes in various performance characteristics
for 44 gold producers during the sample period (January 1993 to December 1998). Inactive (active) hedgers
are firms with a hedge ratio standard deviation below (above) the industry median. Values are based on firm
level averages. “Change in poduction” is quarterly percent change in forecasted production for the subsequent
3 years. “Change in total reserves” is quarterly percent change in the next 3 years. “Change in sales” is the
quarterly percent change in sales. “Change in total assets” is the quarterly percent change in total assets.
“Operating margin” is the average operating income before depreciation, interest, and taxes divided by sales.
“Change in market-to-book” is the quarterly percent change in market-to-book ratio where market value is
defined as the market value of equity plus total debt and book value is the total book value of assets. “Total
market return on equity” is defined as the total quarterly market return on the firm’s common stock.
* Significantly different from inactive hedgers at the 10% level.
B. Selective Hedging and Differences in Operating and Financial
Performance
We further investigate the benefits shareholders realize from selective hedging
by focusing on the changes in operating and financial performance. These
changes should reflect both the direct and the indirect benefits from selective
hedging. For example, we might expect to observe faster growth or better
performance for active hedgers if selective hedging provides some strategic
gain not properly captured by average dollar estimates (e.g., a one-time large
payoff in a very low price state that allows an active hedger to acquire an
inactive hedger at a fire-sale price).
In table 5 we present the average and median quarterly changes during the
sample period for measures of firm size, profitability, and market value of
equity. Our primary interest is whether there are significant differences in
these characteristics between active and inactive hedgers. We examine the
changes in firms’ size using the changes in production, reserves, sales, and
total assets. Values are similar for inactive and active hedgers. For example,
the average inactive hedger increases sales by 2.4% per quarter. By compar-
ison, the average quarterly change in sales for active hedgers is a statistically
indistinguishable 2.6%.18 Overall, there exists no statistically significant evi-
18. Change in sales is the only measure in which the average change is greater for active
hedgers than inactive hedgers, although this difference is not statistically significant. In addition,
this difference is of a much smaller magnitude than the differences in the change in assets or
changes in the measures of operating performance.
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dence that the producers we classify as active hedgers grew at a faster rate
than the other producers.
We examine changes in operating performance by looking at the return on
assets (ROA) and operating margins. Again, we find no evidence that the
operating performance of active hedgers exceeded that of inactive hedgers.
In contrast, median operating margins for active hedgers are significantly lower
than for inactive hedgers. The changes in operating performance during the
sample period are typically negative for both groups. For example, the median
quarterly change in ROA is 1.9% for the inactive hedgers and 4.6% for
the active hedgers.
We estimate the changes in the market value of these firms using changes
in the market-to-book ratio and the quarterly market return to the common
stock. The market value of these firms generally decreases during the sample
period; for both groups of firms the mean and median market return and
change in the market-to-book ratio are negative. If anything, inactive hedgers
appear to have outperformed active hedgers because the median change in
the market-to-book ratio is only 1.6% for the inactive hedgers and 2.9%
for the active hedgers, a difference significant at the 10% level. Altogether,
the results shown in table 5 provide little evidence suggesting that the ad-
ditional variability in the hedge ratios of active hedgers enables them to
outperform inactive hedgers.
C. Characteristics of “Successful” Selective Hedgers
Given the apparent statistical success of some gold producers at selective
hedging, it is interesting to examine what firm traits might be responsible. If
traits suggested by theory or intuition are related to success, this would suggest
that some firms actually could add substantial value even though the median
firm cannot. We conjecture that greater market share may lead to superior
information about the future supply or demand for gold. However, larger firms
may have greater market impact and therefore less ability to profitably trade
on their information. Returning to the analysis in Section III, Stulz (1996)
suggests that firms with more financial flexibility and fewer growth or in-
vestment opportunities will be more likely to selectively hedge. Consequently,
these firms may be the ones that can best take advantage of information and
therefore obtain the greatest profits. To examine these hypotheses, we estimate
regressions with the average gains from the four proxies for selective hedging
methods as the dependent variables. We include as independent variables the
standard deviation of quarterly hedge ratios because this variable may reveal
firms that are more likely to be selective hedgers, firm size (log of total assets),
share of forecasted production as a proxy for market share, Altman’s Z-score
to measure financial flexibility, operating margin as another potential measure
of financial flexibility, and the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for growth or
investment opportunities.
For the sake of brevity, the results from these regressions are not presented.
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Overall, the results indicate weak and inconsistent relations between these
variables and success at selective hedging. We find a weak significantly pos-
itive relation between size and gains when gains from the residual method
are the dependent variable. This result is consistent with the predictions of
Stulz. However, the result is not present when gains from the other methods
are the dependent variable. As noted previously, Tufano (1996) finds that
variables related to manager compensation and tenure explain cross-sectional
differences in the hedging behavior of gold producers. As before, the variables
used by Tufano are available for only a subset of our firms, so we include
them in separate regressions (also not reported). However, we again find no
consistent relations between these variables and gains from hedging.19 In
summary, we do not find reliable evidence that predicted firm characteristics
account for the apparent success of some gold producers at selectively hedging.
V. Conclusions
In this study we investigate the impact of managerial views on corporate
policies by examining the time variation in hedge ratios of gold producers.
Our evidence is consistent with the notion that gold producers selectively
hedge (and can have limited success), yet we find no that evidence that
shareholders benefit substantially from this practice.
Although our analysis is confined to gold producers’ risk management
policies, the results of the analysis have more widespread implications. First,
because selective hedging is common practice for nonfinancial firms in fi-
nancial markets (e.g., foreign exchange and interest rates) where companies
are unlikely to have an informational advantage, successful selective hedging
is probably very uncommon in wider samples of firms. Second, our results
lend further support to the findings that managers’ market views influence
broader financial policy decisions. These tendencies are documented in recent
studies, including Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Faulkender (2005), as well
as survey evidence reported by Graham and Harvey (2001). Again, it is not
clear that managers actually have advantages in the markets that influence the
success of these other policy decisions.20
Empirical researchers in the risk management field should also consider
the effect of managerial views on their tests of theory. For example, relatively
high-frequency selective hedging may introduce significant noise into hedge
ratios that lowers the power of single-period cross-sectional tests. Researchers
may benefit from measuring average hedge ratios over a longer sample period
to get more accurate indications of the level of hedging excluding the effects
of managers’ short-term market views. Widespread selective hedging could
19. Option compensation as a percent of total compensation is negative and significant in the
deviation gains equation and positive and significant in the residual gains equation.
20. The ability of managers to time equity and debt markets when making capital structure
decisions is still under debate. For example, see Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005, 2006) and
Baker et al. (2003).
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be one explanation for the lack of strong (and differing) results in many widely
cited empirical risk management papers.
Our most direct recommendation is that corporations undertake a detailed
analysis of whether they have an advantage relative to other market participants
that justifies incorporating market views into financial decisions. Our findings
suggest that gold producers only rarely have advantages that can be translated
into significant increases in firm value. This evidence is particularly compelling
because gold producers, unlike firms hedging financial risks, are potentially
better informed about gold prices than other market participants. Interestingly,
some firms appear to have already reached this conclusion from their own
experiences. Recently, a representative from Procter and Gamble (a company
that lost over $100 million in 1994 through speculative use of interest rate
derivatives) noted that, “We don’t do a lot of hedging because, if we were
smart enough to hedge, there is actually more money to be made in that than
there is in selling soap.”21
Finally, we propose several possible explanations for why selective hedging
(or, more generally, the practice of managers incorporating market views into
corporate policy decisions) is so widespread. First, risk managers may use
selective hedging to justify their positions or identify their value added. Sec-
ond, success in directional adjustment of hedge ratios, such as that experienced
by many of the firms in our sample, may give the impression to senior man-
agers that selective hedging adds significant value. This may be accentuated
if the costs of selective hedging are difficult to identify, for example, if se-
lective hedging creates a suboptimal risk exposure for the firm. Third, the
lack of guidance from financial theory concerning optimal hedge ratios for
nonfinancial companies may allow any hedge ratio to be justified, and, after
all, it is certainly more fun to battle wits with the market than to follow a
passive or mechanical hedging strategy.
Appendix
Survey of Gold Producers
We mailed the survey reproduced below to the 30 gold producers in our sample
identified as currently operating. (At least seven firms in our sample had been acquired
or merged since 1998; the remaining seven were bankrupt or we were not able to
locate a current address.) Thirteen companies (43%) responded. For one respondent,
the answers to question 1 were inferred from a letter to be “never” for all parts. Two
additional companies that never hedge did not answer question 2. The number of
respondents selecting each answer is provided. For question 2, we calculate an average
for each part and (inverse) rank these averages. An “other” response was also available
for question 2. However, only one respondent utilized this alternative, citing “strength
of balance sheet” with an importance of 2.
21. Scott Miller, Procter and Gamble’s director of national government relations, as quoted in
the Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2001.
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In answering the following questions, consider a “hedge” to be any financial contract
that changes exposure to gold prices. Please circle the response that best describes
your actions on average.
1. How often does your outlook for future gold prices cause your company to . . .
Never Sometimes Frequently
a. Alter the timing of hedges 6 7
b. Alter the size of hedges 4 9
c. Actively take positions in gold derivatives 6 5 2
d. Alter the amount of gold produced 11 2
2. If your company has hedged its exposure to gold prices, how important are each











1 2 3 4 5
a. A near-term market view on gold
prices (! 1 year) 3 4 1 2 2.2/1
b. A long-term market view on gold
prices (1 1 year) 3 3 3 1 2.2/1
c. A recent increase or decrease in gold
prices 1 4 5 1 2.5/3
d. Pricing of derivative contracts (e.g.,
implied volatility) 1 4 3 2 2.6/4
e. A change in short-term debt levels 2 4 4 4.2/10
f. A change in long-term debt levels 2 1 2 2 3 3.3/8
g. A change in the overall debt-to-eq-
uity ratio 1 1 2 3 3 3.6/9
h. A change in cash reserves 1 3 4 1 1 2.8/7
i. A change in expected production 1 3 4 2 2.7/5
j. A change in operating costs 1 2 6 1 2.7/5
k. Competitors’ hedging strategies 2 8 4.8/12
l. The outcome of prior hedges 1 4 5 4.3/11
3. On average, would you say future gold prices are:
Never Predictable
Infrequently
Predictable Often Predictable Always Predictable
2 9 1
4. How often do you believe that gold is either significantly undervalued or over-
valued in the market?
Never Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
2 6 4
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